Volume 23
Issue 4 Thematic Issue: The Economic and
Social Impacts of Covid-19

Article 5

12-2021

A First Peek at Firms’ Cash Flow Dynamics in the Pandemic Year:
A Lesson Learned?
Ana Oblak
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Law, Ljubljana, Slovenia, ana.oblak@pf.uni-lj.si

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.ebrjournal.net/home
Part of the Finance Commons

Recommended Citation
Oblak, A. (2021). A First Peek at Firms’ Cash Flow Dynamics in the Pandemic Year: A Lesson Learned?.
Economic and Business Review, 23(4), 273-285. https://doi.org/10.15458/2335-4216.1292

This Original Article is brought to you for free and open access by Economic and Business Review. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Economic and Business Review by an authorized editor of Economic and Business
Review.

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

A First Peek at Firms’ Cash Flow Dynamics in the
Pandemic Year: A Lesson Learned?
Ana Oblak
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Law, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Abstract
Using a comprehensive database of ﬁnancial data and data on public support, we aim at documenting the actual (and not
predicted) effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on ﬁrms' liquidity. A drain of the non-ﬁnancial corporations’ liquidity was
unprecedented and highly asymmetric across sectors. A simple descriptive analysis enables us to evaluate (partially) the
effectiveness of support measures and to provide insights on how well-targeted support measures were from the sectoral
perspective. Acting in concert, the governments and the European Union (EU) institutions concerned seem to succeed in
preventing massive illiquidity (for now). Crisis measures were targeted mostly at ﬁrms with positive cash ﬂow in the prepandemic year and ensured additional 3.4 percent of ﬁrms from the analysed sectors to sustain positive cash ﬂow and 0.6
percent of ﬁrms to recover. Strikingly, the share of inactive ﬁrms decreased in 2020 compared to 2019, which might indicate
that measures supported de facto dead companies. Considering the proportion of ﬁrms, the most vulnerable sector beneﬁted
most, but not when we think about a reduction in cash ﬂow compensated for with direct grants. The approach “whatever is
necessary” in a form of “ﬂat” public support might thus lead to not optimally targeted beneﬁciaries.
Keywords: Liquidity, Covid-19, Crisis measures, Cash ﬂow, Non-ﬁnancial corporations
JEL classiﬁcation: E61, G18, G21

Introduction

A

fall in economic activity related to the
pandemic was as unprecedented as was the
drain of the non-ﬁnancial corporations’ liquidity.
The pandemic containment measures and related
costs, a drop in foreign and domestic demand,
supply chain distortions, and uncertain economic,
social and political circumstances, all contributed to
an abrupt deterioration of cash ﬂow dynamics.
Avoiding (also) high social and economic costs of
bankruptcies and illiquidity, the policy response
was exceptional in size and aligned, horizontally
(monetary policy, ﬁscal policy and macroprudential
policy) and vertically (at a national and supranational level). The number of bankruptcies or closures of non-ﬁnancial corporations in Slovenia only
increased in the sector hit hardest by the pandemic,
namely accommodation and food service activities
(Bank of Slovenia, 2021).1

The shock was highly asymmetric with more than
half of ﬁrms likely to experience liquidity shortages
in the contact-intensive sectors such as the accommodation and food service activities, transports and
arts, entertainment, and recreation, but less than 20
percent in utilities, information and communication
and professional services sector (Demmou et al.,
2021). A study of liquidity and solvency of nonﬁnancial corporations in 26 European countries by
Ebeke et al. (2021) documents similar, yet more
conservative, results. The complexity of production
networks (motor vehicle industry), intangible-intensity and limited reliance on debt ﬁnance were
also shown to weaken/strengthen the resilience to
the shock posed by the pandemic.
Early literature focuses on the prediction of illiquidity of non-ﬁnancial corporations with and
without policy intervention, with estimated time
needed to become constrained and the size of the
liquidity gap. According to Demmou et al. (2021), up
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1
This is in part attributable to the government measures regarding bankruptcy proceedings in cases when the ﬁrm's insolvency is due to the declaration
of the epidemic (Bank of Slovenia, 2021).
https://doi.org/10.15458/85451.1292
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to 38 percent of ﬁrms in 14 analysed countries would
face liquidity shortfalls in 10 months without government intervention. Direct payments to (at least
partially) cover labour costs and debt moratorium
policies seem to be most beneﬁcial. Using a simple
method based on ﬁrms’ balance sheets, Schivardi
and Romano (2020) predict illiquidity for the whole
population of Italian ﬁrms, month-by-month.
Around 200,000 companies were projected to be
illiquid at the peak which gives rise to a liquidity
shortfall of some 72 billion euros. It is assessed that
due to government guarantees for bank loans,
almost all ﬁrms would be able to cover their
liquidity gap. Ebeke et al. (2021) showed that policy
measures, if implemented as designed, would assist
in reducing liquidity risk substantially. McGeever
et al. (2020) and Demmou et al. (2021) additionally
shed light on sectoral heterogeneity.
Another stance of literature tackles the ﬁt between
support supplied and support needed, considering
size, instruments and sectors. Cirera et al. (2021)
show that ﬁrms and sectors, which experienced a
larger reduction in sales, were more likely to receive
support, but also that ﬁrms not experiencing any
shock received support. The recipients were mistargeted, most likely due to barriers to access policy
support and the limited capacity of public institutions to target. The probability to receive support was lower for small ﬁrms, which were more
susceptible to the shock, but less informed (ApedoAmah et al., 2020). Bole et al. (forthcoming) also ﬁnd
evidence that support measures were inappropriately targeted when sectors are considered. They
further observe that support measures do not
compensate for the non-pharmaceutical interventions impact. Bircan et al. (2020) analyse how
suitable are ﬁnancial debt instruments to ease
liquidity constraints of small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) in 16 emerging markets, and
three Western European comparator countries.
Firms’ debt capacity is considered a crucial factor.
According to the study, Slovenian SMEs are not in a
most favourable position, having limited capacity
for additional debt accumulation and low liquidity.
The key concern raised relates to (potential) overindebtedness and possibly mistargeted support
measures.
The impact of economic policies on ﬁrms’
liquidity and debt accumulation in Slovenia during
the previous crisis episode is well documented by
Bole et al. (2014). The authors analyse cash ﬂow
migration and illiquidity contagion of ﬁrms in bust,
boom, and recovery episodes. It was shown that
liquidity of non-ﬁnancial corporations deteriorated
sharply in the ﬁrst years after the crisis and was

slow to recover. Inability of banks to reﬁnance
foreign loans, reduction in informational capital
(“ability of banks to evaluate future solvency of their
clients”), because of high uncertainty and procyclical macroprudential policy intervention (most
notably in the recovery period) lead to increased
collateralization and credit rationing. This limited
the access of non-ﬁnancial corporations to needed
liquidity and hindered their recovery. The opportunity costs of the suboptimal policy response, when
timing, sequencing and calibration are considered,
seem to be high.
In this paper, we analyse cash ﬂow dynamics of
the total population of Slovenian non-ﬁnancial corporations. Following the methodology employed by
Bole et al. (2014), cash ﬂow status with and without
policy measures in the year of the outbreak of the
pandemic conditional on the cash ﬂow status in the
pre-pandemic year is studied. Using a simple
descriptive analysis, we ﬁrst document the actual
and not predicted effects of the pandemic on ﬁrms’
liquidity and performance. Second, the analysis
enables us to evaluate the effectiveness of government (mostly) employment support through direct
grants and to provide insights on how well-targeted
support measures are from the sectoral perspective.
In short, who the beneﬁciaries are. The evaluation
is, however, partial since the epidemic was prolonged until 15 June 2021 in Slovenia, and a large
part of the state aid which was approved and
accounted for in ﬁnancial statements for 2020, was
paid out in 2021. Harmonized with our methodology, it has a positive effect on the cash ﬂow only in
2021. Third, building upon the study by Bole et al.
(2014) allows us to draw parallels to the Great
Recession. The question of policy response and its
horizontal and vertical alignment is addressed.
The paper is organized as follows. First section
provides an (non-exhaustive) overview of monetary,
ﬁscal and macroprudential policy actions at a national and supranational level. In the second section,
we describe the data and empirical method. The
third section is dedicated to discussion of the results
with reference to the Great Recession and
conclusion.

1 A review of policymakers’ responses to the
COVID-19 pandemic
The policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic
was immediate and exceptional in its size. In anticipation of an unprecedented economic disaster, the
sentiment towards austerity has turned on its head
and the president of the European Commission,
Ursula von der Leyen, underpinned that in a
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Table 1. Macroprudential interventions.
Slovenia

capital buffers
lending standards restrictions
limits on credit growth and volume
limits on large exposures and concentration
liquidity requirements and limits on currency
and maturity mismatch
loan-loss provisioning
minimum capital requirements
leverage ratio
risk weights
other measures

Slovenia

European institutions
concerned

boom
2007e2008

bust
2009e2010

recovery
2011e2013

Covid-19 pandemic
2020e2021

Covid-19 pandemic
2020e2021

0
1
0
1
0

2
0
0
1
0

0
0
1
0
0

1
1
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
1

1
1
0
0
1

1
0
0
0
0

2
0
0
0
2

0
0
0
0
0

1
2
1
1
1

Note: Macroprudential interventions; cumulative number of tightening actions (þ1) less number of loosening actions (1) in the indicated period.
Source: Macroprudential Policies Evaluation Database (MaPPED); Prasnikar et al., 2021; author's calculations

“Draghi way”2: “We will do whatever is necessary to
support the Europeans and the European economy
(European Commission, 2020a).“3
The European Commission acted promptly,
focusing its activities mainly on providing the
Member States with ﬂexibility and ﬁnancial resources to act. Since national budgets were anticipated to be the main source of ﬁscal stimulus, the
Commission activated the general escape clause of
the Stability and Growth Pact, allowing governments to “depart from the budgetary requirements
that would normally apply under the European
ﬁscal framework”. It is expected to be extended
through 2022. Under the Temporary Framework,
which was adopted in just two days, amended ﬁve
times, and extended until 31 December 2021, the
approval process of state aid notiﬁcations was
facilitated, and the rules were relaxed (e.g. extension
of the ceilings for state aid and scope to recapitalization and subordinated debt measures).4 Up to 200
billion euros were made available against a 25billion-euro governments’ guarantee to the European Investment Bank (EIB) and delayed repayments of loans were allowed for to avoid
disruptions in funding and illiquidity of the nonﬁnancial corporations, especially SMEs. Further,
1,211 billion euros were secured through the
2021e2027 Multiannual Financial Framework and
additional 807 billion euros through a temporary

recovery instrument NextGenerationEU, ﬁnanced
by borrowing at the EU level. Under the Recovery
and Resilience Facility Slovenia is to receive 1.8
billion euros in grants and 705 million euros in loans
(European Commission, 2020b).
The Eurosystem responded with an expansion in
securities purchases and reﬁnancing operations, the
collateral terms changed. The participation in reﬁnancing operations of Slovenia banks was yet lower
than the euro area average. According to Bank of
Slovenia (2020), this might be due to the excess
liquidity and ample and growing non-banking
sector deposits available (75.5 percent of total liabilities in June 2020). “Despite the risk of sudden
withdrawals, this funding is more stable than
wholesale funding and less subject to external
shocks” (Bank of Slovenia, 2020).
In Table 1, we present a non-exhaustive overview
of macroprudential policy during the pandemic. The
cumulative number of macroprudential policy
tightening actions (þ1) less the number of macroprudential policy loosening actions (1) is given.
Shifts in macroprudential policy stance are shown
by 10 categories, harmonized with the Macroprudential policies evaluation database (MaPPED)
(Budnik & Kleibl, 2018). To enable comparison, we
additionally present the policy response to the Great
Recession, which was documented by Prasnikar
et al. (2021). Table 1 shows that at the supranational

2
In the face of a sovereign debt crisis in 2012, Mario Draghi said “within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And
believe me, it will be enough” (European Central Bank, 2012).
3
Following the Great Recession and excessive budget deﬁcits resulting from it, many developed countries bet on ﬁscal consolidation policies. Only in
2013, Blanchard and Leigh (2013) proposed that the short-term multipliers in response to the ﬁscal consolidation during 2010 and 2011 were larger in size
than previously believed.
4
A similar framework was adopted following the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
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level the macroprudential policy requirements were
eased. The banking regulators issued interpretations and guidance to ensure additional
ﬂexibility in the existing regulatory (CRR) and accounting framework (introduction of IFRS 9). The
European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Central Bank (ECB) alike postulated that “the
application of support measures should not automatically lead to stricter prudential treatment of
loans when the debtor's ﬁnancial situation is not
deteriorating. When banks approve a loan moratorium that meets the conditions for a general payment moratorium, this does not automatically
require the reclassiﬁcation of the exposure as
forborne or defaulted.” Favourable treatment introduced in the area of capital requirements for credit
risk is also being applied (Bank of Slovenia, 2020;
Bank of Slovenia, 2021).5
The ECB granted operational relief in the form of
adjusting timetables, processes and deadlines for
each individual bank, and more signiﬁcantly, eased
capital buffer and capital composition requirements.6 Estimated capital relief amounted to
120 billion euros and “could be used to absorb losses
or potentially ﬁnance up to 1.8 trillion euros of
lending” (European Central Bank, 2020). Also, the
national macroprudential authorities acted (or were
expected to act) countercyclically opting to lower or
fully release the countercyclical capital buffer, systemic risk buffer or other systemically important
institutions buffer.7 The Bank of Slovenia kept its
macroprudential policy toolkit nearly unchanged. It
entails macroprudential restrictions on household
lending, the countercyclical capital buffer, which
stood at zero already before the outbreak of the
pandemic, the buffer for other systemically important institutions, a macroprudential liquidity measure (the gross loans to deposits ﬂows8) and
currently irrelevant macroprudential caps on deposit interest rates. Restrictions on proﬁt distributions by banks and by leasing companies were
introduced in April 2020 (amended in February
2021) and a temporary exclusion of a decline in

income caused by the pandemic from the creditworthiness evaluation was allowed for (Bank of
Slovenia, 2020; Bank of Slovenia, 2021).
The ﬁrst response of the Slovenian government to
the Covid-19 pandemic was the law allowing the
deferral of loan payments for at least 12 months for
non-ﬁnancial corporations, sole traders, farmers
and private individuals. It was followed by nine
ﬁscal stimulus packages, which amounted to almost
5 billion euros in the period until June 2021. Table 2
summarizes support measures and ﬁnancial resources provided. Employment support accounted
for roughly 36 percent, followed by measures to
maintain liquidity, which amounted to 1.4 billion
euros or 27.7 percent. Due to an extensive ﬁscal
stimulus, the general government sector returned to
a deﬁcit of 7.7 percent of GDP in 2020 from a surplus
of 0.4 percent in year 2019. The projected general
government deﬁcit in 2021 is 7.9 percent of GDP
down from 8.6 percent owing to more favourable
economic outlook. Also, in 2008 and 2009 the government acted countercyclically, but the intervention was less intensive (Republic of Slovenia Fiscal
Council, 2021; Statistical Ofﬁce of the Republic of
Slovenia, 2021).

2 Data
Our empirical analysis draws upon the study of
cash ﬂow dynamics and illiquidity contagion of nonﬁnancial companies in Slovenia during the Great
Recession by Bole et al. (2014). Using comprehensive
databases of ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial data and data on
state aid and employing a simple descriptive analysis,
we ﬁrst document the effects of the pandemic on
ﬁrms’ liquidity and performance. Second, cash ﬂow
status with and without policy measures in the year of
the outbreak of the pandemic conditional on the cash
ﬂow status in the pre-pandemic year is studied.
We use three sources of data in the empirical
analysis. The ﬁrst one is a comprehensive database
of ﬁnancial data provided by the Agency of the
Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and
Related Services (AJPES). The data encompasses the

5
“Transitional period for limiting the impact of IFRS 9 provisions on the regulatory capital of banks is being extended by two years (until the end of 2024),
thereby mitigating any impact on bank lending capacity from a sudden signiﬁcant increase in expected credit-loss provisions during the economic
downturn caused by Covid-19 (Bank of Slovenia, 2020).” As an insight, after the ﬁrst quarter of 2010, the Bank of Slovenia launched a process of accelerated
implementation of stricter capital requirements (Bole et al., 2014).
6
“Temporarily, banks are allowed to operate below the level of capital deﬁned by the Pillar 2 Guidance, the capital conservation buffer and the liquidity
coverage ratio.” Furthermore, banks are also “allowed to partially use capital instruments that do not qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital, for
example Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 instruments, to meet the Pillar 2 Requirements (P2R)” (European Central Bank, 2020).
7
The countercyclical capital buffer was lowered or fully released in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Slovakia, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland,
Lithuania, and the UK. The macroprudential authorities in Estonia and Finland used other instruments at their disposal and reduced the systemic risk
buffer rates to zero, while the Netherlands reduced the existing rates for three institutions. Finland and the Netherlands additionally opted to selectively
reduce the buffer for other systemically important institutions (Bank of Slovenia, 2020).
8
“A macroprudential measure known as gross loans to deposits ﬂows (GLTDF) recommends that banks with a positive annual inﬂow of deposits by the
non-banking sector should have an annual increase in lending to the non-banking sector (before impairment) that is not negative. Preventing the banks'
excessive reliance on unstable sources of funding (Bank of Slovenia, 2020).”
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Table 2. Covid-19 measures adopted by the Slovenian government.
Category

Description of measures

Covid measures

2020 MarcheDecember
in million EUR

2021 JanuaryeJune
in million EUR

2,910

2,049

Measures to preserve jobs

The partial coverage of wage compensation during temporary lay-off (furloughing), the crisis bonus, the monthly
basic income and relief from the payment of social security contributions for
claimants who were unable to pursue
their business activities, temporary cash
assistance for job loss from the ﬁrst day
of unemployment until the lifting of the
emergency measures.

1,137

639

Measures for the smooth
operation of public services

Employee bonuses, control of the
epidemic (protective equipment, etc.),
measures in education, sport and culture, compensation for healthcare service providers.

508

728

Measures to maintain
consumption and social position

A 200-euro voucher per adult and a 50euro voucher per child in 2020 and an
additional 100-euro voucher in 2021 to
be spent in accommodation in Slovenia,
solidarity bonus for various groups (e.g.
from 130 to 300 euros for pensioners).

291

50

Other expenditure
Measures to maintain liquidity
Deferred and instalment payments
of tax
Uncalculated and unpaid advance
payments of corporate income
tax liabilities

The option of deferring tax liabilities for
up to 24 months or paying liabilities in
24 monthly instalments. A two-month
extension of the deadline for submitting
the return for the personal income tax
prepayment for business activities and
the tax return, a three-month deferral of
the payment of social security contributions for self-employed persons who
have no other employees, the deferral
of the prepayment of personal income
tax on business activities for April and
May 2020 (until April 2021).
Reimbursement of ﬁxed costs
The direct grants to all companies irrespective of their size and of the sector,
which have suffered a decline of at least
30% in their revenue in the period between October and December 2020
compared to the same period in 2019.
Also applies in ﬁrst half of 2021.
Guarantees
Government guarantees for a moratoLiquidity loans
rium on payments deriving from all liDeferred payment of loan
abilities under loan agreements for up
liabilities e SID Bank
to 12 months for non-ﬁnancial corporations, sole traders, farmers and private individuals. Loans made from
public funds, encompassing additional
ﬁnancing by SID banka and additional
guarantees for loans and liquidity loans
to SMEs by the Slovene Enterprise
Fund, the guarantee scheme for corporates and the corporate debt repurchase
mechanism.
Source: Republic of Slovenia Fiscal Council, 2021; Bank of Slovenia, 2020.

67

111

906
219

466
18

171

0

0

296

192
305
19

140
66
0
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Table 3. List of variables and calculation.
Variable

Calculation of the variable

Financial debt

(Long-term ﬁnancial liabilities þ Short-term ﬁnancial liabilities)
/Total assets
Short-term operating liabilities/Total assets
Short-term operating receivables/Total assets
(Land þ Buildings þ Other equipment and machinery)
/Total assets
(Operating proﬁt - Operating loss þ Write-offs in value)
/Total assets
(Operating proﬁt - Operating loss þ Write-offs in value - State aid11)/Total
assets
A dummy variable with the value 1 if a company is categorized in
manufacturing segment (section C of NACE Rev.2)
A dummy variable with the value 1 if a company is categorized in construction segment (section F of NACE Rev.2)
A dummy variable with the value 1 if a company is categorized in utilities
segment (sections D, E of NACE Rev. 2.)
A dummy variable with the value 1 if a company is categorized in nonvulnerable service segment (sections K, L, M, N of NACE Rev. 2.)
A dummy variable with the value 1 if a company is categorized in vulnerable
service segment (sections G, H, I, J, R, S, T of NACE Rev. 2.)
A categorical variable with the value 0 if a company is inactive,12 1 if it has
operating cash ﬂow <0, 2 if it has operating cash ﬂow >0
A categorical variable with the value 0 if a company is inactive, 1 if it has
operating cash ﬂow without support measures <0, 2 if it has operating cash
ﬂow without support measures >0

Operating liabilities
Operating receivables
Collateral
Operating cash ﬂow
Operating cash ﬂow without support measures
Manufacturing
Construction
Utilities
Non-vulnerable services
Vulnerable services
Cash ﬂow status
Cash ﬂow without support measures

total population of non-ﬁnancial companies, liable
to report under the Companies Act for national
statistics purposes. That is 68,125 limited and unlimited liability companies (including listed companies) after the formal reorganization of the status
of a company, economic interest groupings and
main ofﬁces of foreign business entities9 in 2020,
67,178 in 2019, 66,749 in 2018, and 66,470 in 2017.
Based on the list of companies at the beginning of
bankruptcy, liquidation10 or termination, also provided by AJPES, the database was supplemented
(updated) by 546 observations in 2021, 964 in 2020,
1,205 in 2019, 1,259 in 2018, and 1,210 in 2017. The
data on the state aid to mitigate the effects of the
pandemic were retrieved from ERAR, an application
for the portrayal of public money use in the Republic of Slovenia.
To categorize companies in segments, we draw on
the study by Bole et al. (forthcoming), which evaluates the Covid-19 support measures to alleviate the
cost of social distancing at a sectoral level. The authors consider two main characteristics, determining the economic losses of a particular sector
and consequently classiﬁcation, namely essentiality
of the sector and the ability to organize work from

home. Utilities and manufacturing are sectors not
susceptible to a large demand shock and were
deemed essential, thus could stay open despite the
policy of constrained social mobility. A large demand shock due to the policy of constrained social
mobility is common to a third segment of service
sector, which includes inessential (e.g. hospitality,
arts) or essential sectors (e.g. transportation). Other
service sectors were affected by the policy of constrained social mobility but had the ability to organize work from home. Taking into account nonpharmaceutical mitigation measures, we could
categorize companies in ﬁve homogenous segments: manufacturing, construction, utilities, nonvulnerable service segment and vulnerable service
segment. The manufacturing segment covers all
companies with economic activities in section
manufacturing of NACE Rev. 2. The second analysed segment construction includes companies
classiﬁed in section construction. Utilities encompass sections electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, as well as water supply, sewerage,
waste management and remediation activities of
NACE Rev. 2. The non-vulnerable service segment
comprises all companies with economic activities

9
Banks, insurance companies, stock exchange, investment funds and certain other ﬁnancial and investment companies that do not use the accounting
standard for companies are not included.
10
Companies in insolvency proceedings (bankruptcy, liquidation) are not required to submit annual reports.
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classiﬁed in sections: ﬁnancial and insurance activities, real estate activities, professional, scientiﬁc and
technical activities, and administrative and support
service activities. The ﬁfth segment is the vulnerable
service segment, and it includes ﬁrms from economic activities in section wholesale and retail
trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles,
transportation and storage, accommodation and
food service activities, information and communication, arts, entertainment and recreation, other
service activities, and activities of households as
employers. Agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing, mining
and quarrying, government sectors (O-Q) and activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies
are excluded from the analysis.
Table 3 documents deﬁnitions and calculation of
variables. In the second column of Table 3, with
calculations of the variables, we use item names
identical to the ones in the original AJPES database.

3 Results
3.1 Performance of companies
In Table 4, we present descriptive statistics for the
main variables by segment for the period
2018e2020. Financial debt, short-term operating liabilities, short-term operating receivables, collateral, operating cash ﬂow and operating cash ﬂow
without support measures are documented for
manufacturing, construction, utilities and both service segments separately at the ﬁrst-lower quartile
(p25), median (p50) and third-upper quartile (p75).
Also, the number of observations is given.
Table 4 and Figs. 1e5 make it evident that support
measures prevented a huge drop in cash ﬂow for all
quartiles of ﬁrms and all segments, but failed to
prevent its worsening (except for utilities), when
only direct grants are considered. A median ﬁrm in
the vulnerable service sector recorded a decline in
cash ﬂow by 29 percent. Without policy intervention, the cash ﬂow would decline by more than 50
percent for the ﬁrms mentioned, 42 percent for a
median ﬁrm in the non-vulnerable service sector, 36
percent in construction and 27 percent in
manufacturing. Taking into account the extent to
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which support measures were able to sustain cash
ﬂow, the median ﬁrm of the most vulnerable
segment beneﬁted the least in relative terms
compared to other segments. The ﬁrms with stronger cash ﬂow position (upper-quartile ﬁrms) proved
to be more resilient to the shock across all segments.
A decline in cash ﬂow was at 13e16 percent without
measures and at 6e9 percent with measures. As
already evident vulnerable service segment ﬁrms
were indeed hit hardest, even more so when the
ﬁrms in the lower quartile are considered. Their
cash ﬂow from operations was negative (0.6
percent of the total balance sheet sum) already in
the pre-pandemic years and with the pandemic it
additionally deteriorated (2.8 percent with support
measures and 4.9 percent without). A quarter of
non-vulnerable service sector ﬁrms with the weakest cash ﬂow exhibit a similar pattern, apart from a
milder drop in the pandemic year. The solvency of
these two subsegments might be endangered. Prior
to the pandemic, manufacturing ﬁrms had stronger
cash ﬂow compared to construction and services,
but did not prove more resilient to the shock.
Considering a reduction of cash ﬂow in terms of
percent of balance sheet sum, a lower-quartile
manufacturing ﬁrm followed a lower-quartile
vulnerable service segment ﬁrm. The cash ﬂow was
rather stable in 2019 compared to 2018 for all
quartiles of ﬁrms and all segments.
Financial debt variable is especially relevant,
when assessing the ability of non-ﬁnancial corporations, which are not able to sustain positive cash
ﬂow from operations, to access debt ﬁnance. This
includes the instruments made available by the
government. According to Bircan et al. (2020),
Slovenian SMEs have little room for additional debt.
Debt was already on the rise throughout the whole
observed period in manufacturing, construction,
and services (both non-vulnerable and vulnerable
sectors), apart from manufacturing in the pandemic
year. The median and upper quartile levels of
ﬁnancial debt in manufacturing decreased to 11.9
percent and to 35.2 percent of the total balance
sheet, respectively. Manufacturing ﬁrms indeed reported a decrease in demand for bank loans for

11
The data on state aid was retrieved from ERAR and represents the state aid in the form of direct grants paid to the non-ﬁnancial corporations in 2020
rather than the state aid approved for the year 2020. The latter is presented in the proﬁt and loss account in the AJPES database, but after a thorough
inspection signiﬁcant discrepancies were found in the application of the standard 15. According to Note 1 to the Slovenian Accounting Standard 15 (Ofﬁcial
Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 63/20), “organizations that will obtain any state aid … for the containment or elimination of the consequences of the
Covid-19 epidemic, must record the state aid received under other operating revenues (Pojasnilo 1, 2020)”. This would correspond to the item AOP124
Subsidies, grants, allowances, compensation, and other revenues associated with products and services in our database. Instead of AOP124, the accurate
data on state aid paid to the non-ﬁnancial corporations in 2020 are used as a proxy for Covid-19 support measures. The state aid paid indeed has a direct
effect on liquidity in contrast to the state aid approved. It should, however, be noted that, conceptually, this differs from our approach to evaluating cash
ﬂow status, where we assume that ﬁrms generate their cash inﬂows (outﬂows) from their sales (costs) rather than from their short-term operating receivables (short-term operating liabilities) and cash.
12
Inactive ﬁrms are deﬁned as ﬁrms at the beginning of bankruptcy, liquidation, or termination.
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Table 4. Financial and intercompany debt, cash ﬂow with and without state aid and potential collateral.
Manufacturing
Year
Total number of
companies
Cash ﬂow

N

Construction

Utilities

Non-vulnerable
service segment

2018 2019

2020 2018 2019

2020 2018 2019 2020

8,153 8,189

8,328 7,134 7,219

7,511

p25 0.018 0.021 0.002
p50 0.089 0.088 0.074
p75 0.166 0.162 0.150
Cash ﬂow without
p25
0.002
support measures p50
0.064
p75
0.141
Financial debt
p25 0.000 0.000 0.000
p50 0.119 0.127 0.119
p75 0.343 0.357 0.352
Short-term operating p25 0.107 0.097 0.093
receivables
p50 0.225 0.211 0.202
p75 0.413 0.398 0.377
Short-term operating p25 0.120 0.112 0.108
liabilities
p50 0.244 0.226 0.219
p75 0.458 0.430 0.427
Collateral
p25 0.000 0.000 0.000
p50 0.078 0.092 0.090
p75 0.385 0.390 0.384
Source: AJPES, 2021; author's calculations

2018

2019

2020 2018

2019

2020

938

928 19,901 20,074 20,226 27,521 27,636 28,003

0.000 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.009
0.073 0.076 0.063 0.086 0.085
0.165 0.165 0.152 0.150 0.157
0.009
0.049
0.140
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
0.043 0.069 0.075 0.237 0.230
0.270 0.298 0.315 0.595 0.569
0.131 0.115 0.107 0.020 0.018
0.350 0.330 0.301 0.085 0.083
0.623 0.601 0.564 0.281 0.280
0.138 0.132 0.126 0.024 0.026
0.331 0.312 0.301 0.112 0.109
0.586 0.561 0.548 0.328 0.311
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.056
0.090 0.113 0.121 0.568 0.540

0.015 0.003 0.005 0.011 0.005 0.006 0.028
0.089 0.045 0.045 0.035 0.055 0.055 0.039
0.167 0.142 0.140 0.131 0.148 0.146 0.133
0.012
0.021
0.049
0.086
0.026
0.027
0.165
0.120
0.123
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.185 0.019 0.029 0.033 0.080 0.097 0.109
0.531 0.373 0.392 0.410 0.408 0.422 0.456
0.015 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.054 0.053 0.061
0.086 0.173 0.166 0.149 0.206 0.201 0.196
0.274 0.432 0.429 0.391 0.440 0.433 0.416
0.028 0.042 0.039 0.035 0.109 0.104 0.094
0.113 0.181 0.175 0.162 0.280 0.270 0.252
0.299 0.442 0.419 0.403 0.563 0.546 0.533
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.531 0.046 0.051 0.052 0.101 0.115 0.122

investments in the ﬁrst half of 2020 (Bank of
Slovenia, 2020). Utilities segment ﬁrms, which had
the highest level of ﬁnancial debt, deleveraged in
the observed period. The level of ﬁnancial debt of
highly indebted ﬁrms (third quartile) in the
vulnerable service sector increased most by 3.6
percentage points in the pandemic year. Also, the
survey data provided by the Bank of Slovenia show
that accommodation and food service activities
sectors, classiﬁed in vulnerable service segment,
increased their indebtedness most. A median and
an upper quartile construction segment ﬁrm
increased their indebtedness in 2019 as well as in
2020, most likely due to the favourable real-estate
market conditions.
As anticipated, manufacturing and utilities ﬁrms
have higher available collateral and thus higher
capacity to borrow in the times of crisis than ﬁrms
from construction and services. More than a half of
the companies from construction, non-vulnerable
service segment and vulnerable service sector had
no collateral available, and only one quarter of
companies had collateral higher than 12.1 percent,
5.2 percent, and 12.0 percent of total assets,
respectively.
Almost uniformly across the distribution, shortterm operating liabilities declined for ﬁrms from all
segments in the observed period. Short-term operating liabilities, which could be understood as an
alternative source of ﬁnance, rose only for utilities
segment ﬁrms in the lower quartile in the pandemic

945

Vulnerable
service segment

year. With the pandemic, the process of deleveraging slowed down in manufacturing, construction,
and for the upper-quartile ﬁrms in services. Service
sector ﬁrms with lower intercompany indebtedness
decreased their indebtedness towards suppliers at a
higher pace after the outbreak of the pandemic.
Across the whole distribution, construction ﬁrms
depend on the intercompany debt most. A rather
high level of operating liabilities was evident also
for ﬁrms from the upper quartile in vulnerable
service segment ﬁrms.
Analysing short-term receivables, a similar
pattern of decreasing level of receivables can be
observed. A drop following the outbreak of the
pandemic was especially pronounced for the upperquartile ﬁrms in manufacturing and non-vulnerable
service segment ﬁrms, and for the half of the ﬁrms
with higher level of short-term receivables in construction. Considering net receivables (short-term
receivables less short-term operating liabilities),
vulnerable service segment of the ﬁrst quartile
decreased their net borrowing positions, as opposed
to an increase in other segments. Except in utilities,
net lenders managed to decrease their positions in
the pandemic year.
3.2 Cash ﬂow dynamics
In Table 5, we document the cash ﬂow migration
of ﬁrms in the pre-pandemic years of 2018 and 2019,
and in the pandemic year of 2020, drawing on the
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Year 2019
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Fig. 1. Cumulative distribution of cash ﬂow per unit of balance sheet
with and without support measures in years 2018e2020. Source: AJPES,
2021; author's calculations.

0

Construction

-.5

.5

0
Cash flow per unit of balance sheet
Year 2020 without support measures
Year 2019

Year 2020
Year 2018

Fig. 2. Cumulative distribution of cash ﬂow per unit of balance sheet
with and without support measures in years 2018e2020. Source: AJPES,
2021; author's calculations.

Non-vulnerable service segment

Fig. 3. Cumulative distribution of cash ﬂow per unit of balance sheet
with and without support measures in years 2018e2020. Source: AJPES,
2021; author's calculations.

Fig. 4. Cumulative distribution of cash ﬂow per unit of balance sheet
with and without support measures in years 2018e2020. Source: AJPES,
2021; author's calculations.

methodology used by Bole et al. (2014). We show
how the cash ﬂow in the (current) year T is structured conditional on the cash ﬂow in the previous
year T-1. Based on liquidity position, we recognize
three categories of ﬁrms in year T. First, ﬁrms which
have positive cash ﬂow (greater than zero), second,
ﬁrms, which have negative cash ﬂow (less than
zero), and third, ﬁrms, which are inactive. In
continuation, we call ﬁrms with positive cash ﬂow in
year T-1, which migrate to negative cash ﬂow in
year T, the “collapsing” ﬁrms, and ﬁrms with
negative cash ﬂow in year T-1, which improve their
performance to positive cash ﬂow in T, the “recovering” ﬁrms. The ﬁgures shown are in percent of the
total number of companies by segment.
From Table 5, it is evident that the Covid-19
pandemic deteriorated liquidity of ﬁrms in all segments, but utilities. The segment proved to be

Utilities

Fig. 5. Cumulative distribution of cash ﬂow per unit of balance sheet
with and without support measures in years 2018e2020. Source: AJPES,
2021; author's calculations.
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Table 5. The cash ﬂow migration matrix.
Year
Manufacturing
2018
2019
2020
H0: p19 - p20 ¼ 0
2020 without support measures
H0: p20 - p20w ¼ 0
Construction
2018
2019
2020
H0: p19 - p20 ¼ 0
2020 without support measures
H0: p20 - p20w ¼ 0

Negative to
inactive

Negative to
negative

Negative to
positive

Positive to
inactive

Positive to
negative

Positive to
positive

Total number
of companies

0.87
0.79
0.53
*
0.53
e

10.32
10.51
11.43
*
11.89

6.23
6.13
5.64

0.56
0.35
0.27
0.27
e

75.24
75.54
71.13
***
67.90
***

7,693
7,751
7,867

5.19

6.79
6.68
11.00
***
14.22
***

1.23
0.95
0.56
**
0.56

12.67
11.80
13.55
***
14.12

8.77
6.86
6.88
6.30

0.54
0.60
0.38
*
0.38

7.26
8.89
12.63
***
16.15
***

69.53
70.90
66.00
***
62.49
***

7,867

6,268
6,330
6,618
6,618

Utilities
2018
2019
2020
H0: p19 - p20 ¼ 0
2020 without support measures
H0: p20 - p20w ¼ 0

0.79
0.56
0.23

13.80
13.23
12.59

4.26
4.60
5.22

0.22
0.22
0.23

3.25
4.82
4.99

77.67
76.57
76.76

891
892
882

0.23
e

12.70

5.10

0.23
e

5.90

75.85

882

Non-vulnerable service segment
2018
2019
2020
H0: p19 - p20 ¼ 0
2020 without support measures
H0: p20 - p20w ¼ 0

1.02
1.12
0.90
**
0.90
e

19.25
18.85
20.26
***
20.86

9.42
8.48
8.29

8.22
9.41
12.35
***
15.23
***

61.54
61.46
57.70
***
54.83
***

18,482
18,742
19,084

7.69
**

0.55
0.69
0.49
**
0.49
e

Vulnerable service segment
2018
2019
2020
H0: p19 - p20 ¼ 0
2020 without support measures
H0: p20 - p20w ¼ 0

1.19
1.15
0.86
***
0.86
e

17.66
17.46
18.95
***
19.66
**

8.97
8.46
7.89
**
7.18
***

0.55
0.53
0.41
**
0.41
e

8.44
8.97
14.10
***
18.01
***

63.19
63.43
57.78
***
53.89
***

19,084

25,293
25,454
25,949
25,949

Note: A two sample proportions test is used; ***, **, and * denote statistically signiﬁcant values at 1, 5, and 10% on a two-tailed test,
respectively.
Source: AJPES, 2021; author's calculations

resilient to the shock caused by the pandemic with
an increase in the share of recovering ﬁrms and
ﬁrms which were able to maintain positive cash ﬂow
with policy intervention. There was only a minor
increase in the share of collapsing ﬁrms. Comparing
the proportions of ﬁrms by category (e.g. positive to
positive) with and without measures for years 2019
and 2020, policy intervention was shown not to have
a statistically signiﬁcant effect in helping ﬁrms from
utilities to maintain their pre-pandemic liquidity
position. In continuation, the utilities segment as a
notable exception is excluded from the analysis.
The share of ﬁrms (overall) migrating to negative
cash ﬂow increased by 5.5 percentage points
(z ¼ 21.17, p ¼ 0.000) to more than 30 percent in the

pandemic year of 2020. Absent measures the share of
ﬁrms with negative cash ﬂow would surge by more
than 9 percentage points to almost 35 percent.
Already in the pre-pandemic year ﬁrms with negative
cash ﬂow accounted for more than one quarter of
both service segment ﬁrms and even strengthened to
32.6 percent of non-vulnerable service sector and 33.1
percent of vulnerable service sector in 2020. Without
policy intervention, additional 3e5 percent of companies in each segment would migrate to negative
cash ﬂow. This represents around 2,400 ﬁrms, 1,200
from vulnerable service sector. Despite minor differences across segments, the policy intervention
seems to be targeted properly for the highest share
(4.6 percent, z ¼ 10.90, p ¼ 0.000) of ﬁrms from the
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vulnerable service segment, prevented from
migrating to negative cash ﬂow. Strikingly, the share
of inactive ﬁrms did not increase in the year of
pandemic. There was a decrease in the share of ﬁrms
migrating to inactive from positive cash ﬂow and
negative cash ﬂow alike. This could indicate that the
Covid-19 measures sustained also de facto dead
companies. The number of companies migrating
from negative cash ﬂow to inactive dropped by 37
percent in construction (0.4 percentage points,
z ¼ 2.56, p ¼ 0.010), 28 percent in manufacturing (0.3
percentage points, z ¼ 1.95, p ¼ 0.050), 23 percent
(0.3 percentage points, z ¼ 3.23, p ¼ 0.001) in
vulnerable and 22 (0.2 percentage points, z ¼ 2.08,
p ¼ 0.037) in non-vulnerable service sector.
After the outbreak of the pandemic, around 60
percent of ﬁrms (down from 65 percent) in the
analysed segments were able to sustain positive
cash ﬂow. Positive to positive cash ﬂow ﬁrms
accounted for the lowest part of ﬁrms in both service
segments (58 percent), followed by construction (66
percent) and manufacturing (70 percent) in 2020.
Along the same lines, the share of ﬁrms migrating
from positive to negative (the so-called “collapsing
ﬁrms”) was the lowest in manufacturing at 11
percent despite a marked increase in 2020.
Collapsing ﬁrms accounted for 12.4 percent of the
non-vulnerable service segment, 12.6 percent of the
construction segment, and 14.1 percent of all ﬁrms
in vulnerable service segment. Without policy
intervention, additional 2e4 percent (see sixth column in Table 5) of companies from each sector
would migrate from positive to negative cash ﬂow or
(potentially) to inactivity, and around one sixth of
ﬁrms would be collapsing. Again, the highest share
of ﬁrms from vulnerable service sector was able to
sustain positive cash ﬂow due to policy intervention.
However, when the number of ﬁrms which are not
able to sustain positive cash ﬂow with measures is
compared to the number of ﬁrms which are not able
to sustain positive cash ﬂow without measures, the
lowest share of ﬁrms beneﬁted.
In the pre-pandemic years, the percentage of
collapsing ﬁrms in manufacturing was rather stable,
but not in construction and services. Worsening of
liquidity position was evident already in 2019 with
an increase in the share of collapsing ﬁrms. The
share of recovering ﬁrms, which migrate from
negative cash ﬂow in year T-1 to positive cash ﬂow
in year T, decreased in the observed period in all
four segments, most notably in construction (see
third column in Table 5). The recovery was further
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depressed by the pandemic in manufacturing and
both service segments, though, negligibly for nonvulnerable service segment ﬁrms. Policy intervention enabled to at most 0.7 percent of ﬁrms
(z ¼ 2.05, p ¼ 0.040) in the vulnerable service
segment to migrate from negative to positive cash
ﬂow in the pandemic year.13

4 Discussion of the results with reference to
the Great Recession and conclusion
As discussed in the introduction, Bole et al. (2014)
analysed cash ﬂow migration and illiquidity contagion of ﬁrms in Slovenia during the Great Recession. It was shown that liquidity of non-ﬁnancial
corporations deteriorated sharply in the ﬁrst years
after the crisis and was slow to recover. The share of
ﬁrms which were able to sustain positive cash ﬂow
in 2009 plummeted by more than 8 percent and the
decrease is comparable to the shock posed by the
pandemic to the non-ﬁnancial corporations’ cash
ﬂows absent measures. The cash ﬂow of nonﬁnancial companies continued to deteriorate for two
years after the previous crisis emerged and the level
of ﬁrms able to sustain positive cash ﬂow had not
yet reached the pre-crisis level in 2012, the last year
included in the study. The policy response to the
pandemic was considerably more decisive and
ensured additional 3.4 percent of ﬁrms to sustain
positive cash ﬂow, 0.6 percent of ﬁrms to recover
and a decrease in the share of inactive ﬁrms. As
mainly companies with positive cash ﬂow in the
pre-pandemic year received support, this indicates
to a well-targeted intervention but with a probable
malfunction, i.e. sustaining de facto dead companies, which do not migrate to inactivity due to
support received.
It should, however, be noted that the support
measures included in the analysis are for the most
part employment support measures, which indeed
account for more than 35 percent of all public support to counter the pandemic-induced crisis but are
not the only signiﬁcant type of support. Accurate
data on other types of support, e.g. the option of
deferring tax liabilities for up to 24 months, relief
from the payment of social security contributions, or
debt moratoria on payments deriving from all liabilities under loan agreements for up to 12 months,
are not available through ERAR, which only provides data on directly paid out grants by the date of
payment. Since our methodological approach is
based on the state aid paid and not approved, the

The rules prohibit state aid to ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress on 31st of December 2019.
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policy measures are estimated to positively
contribute to corporate liquidity also in 2021. For
example, reimbursement of ﬁxed costs was
approved for the last quarter of 2020, but is only
paid out in 2021. The effects of the policy intervention are thus underestimated in 2020 and are to be
reﬂected in non-ﬁnancial corporation's ﬁnancial
statements also in 2021 and in the following years.
Another limitation of the study is related to the
methodology used. A simple descriptive analysis
falls short of providing an insight into the transmission mechanism behind it. One possible avenue
for future research would thus be building an economic model to explain the transmission mechanism. Another recommendation for future research
would relate to sectoral analysis, which is based on
the criteria of essentiality and ability to work from
home. Contact-intensity, complexity of the supply
chain, intangible-intensity, reliance on debt ﬁnance
and size would be equally relevant criteria for categorisation into segments.
Accounting for (only) directly paid out grants, a
huge drop in cash ﬂow for all quartiles of ﬁrms and
all segments was avoided, but not worsening. A
notable exception were utilities, which strengthened
their cash ﬂow position without and even more so
with public support. The result is not statistically
signiﬁcant, but it still raises the question of mistargeting the beneﬁciaries. Cirera et al. (2021) ﬁnd
that ﬁrms not experiencing any shock received
support. Another result of our study is equivalent,
namely that sectors with a large reduction in sales or
cash ﬂow were more likely to receive support. Table
5 makes it evident that when we consider the proportion of ﬁrms which were prevented from
migrating to negative cash ﬂow, the highest share
(number) of recipients in absolute terms was from
the most vulnerable service segment. Also, the
highest share (number) of ﬁrms from vulnerable
service segment (4 percent) sustained positive cash
ﬂow due to support measures. However, when the
number of ﬁrms which are not able to sustain positive cash ﬂow with measures is compared to the
number of ﬁrms which are not able to sustain positive cash ﬂow without measures, the lowest share
beneﬁted. A median ﬁrm in the vulnerable service
segment also recorded the highest decline in cash
ﬂow by 29 percent. Without policy intervention, the
cash ﬂow would decline by more than 50 percent
and would be disastrous. The support measures
compensated for a considerable part of a reduction
in cash ﬂow, but compared to other sectors for the
lowest when a median ﬁrm is considered. The
approach “whatever is necessary” in form of “ﬂat”

public support might thus lead to suboptimally
targeted beneﬁciaries.
With hindsight to the Great Recession, a question
of disturbances in the provision of bank credit to the
non-ﬁnancial corporations to cover the estimated
liquidity gap of 0.6 billion euros (cash ﬂow from
operations) remains. In the recovery period of the
Great Recession, adverse developments in the nonﬁnancial corporations’ sector liquidity could be in
part attributed to erratic policy response (Bole et al.,
2014). Procyclical macroprudential policy intervention intensiﬁed the process of collateralization and
credit rationing and thus limited the access to
needed liquidity and hindered recovery of the nonﬁnancial corporations. So far, it seems that the
lesson has been learned. The governments and the
European Union institutions concerned acted in
concert to prevent massive illiquidity and bankruptcies. The policies are aligned and exceptional in
size (intensity). For instance, macroprudential requirements across seven categories were eased at a
supranational level and national macroprudential
authorities were expected to act accordingly. The
countercyclical capital buffer, which already stood at
zero in Slovenia, was lowered or fully released in 11
European countries. The macroprudential authorities in Estonia, Finland and the Netherlands used
additional instruments at their disposal, whereas
the macroprudential authorities seem to be more
conservative in Slovenia. The restrictions to proﬁt
distributions were introduced in April 2020, but
otherwise the policy toolkit remained unchanged.
In the second quarter of 2020, banks reported, on
balance, broadly unchanged credit standards in the
euro area, but not in Slovenia. A tightening of credit
standards and credit terms and conditions for loans
or credit lines to enterprises at most banks followed
the outbreak of the pandemic. According to the Bank
of Slovenia (2021), reasons cited by banks were “the
increased uncertainty brought by the pronounced
downturn in the economy and the economic outlook
caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, the worsening
situation in certain sectors, and the change in the
acceptable level of risk at the banks.” Another
tightening of credit standards by domestic banks
followed in the third and fourth quarters of 2020. The
reaction of Slovenian banks compares to the one in
the previous crisis, when all the banks tightened
their credit standards in the fourth quarter of 2008
and the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, just milder.
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